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s 13332

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the com-

mittee having considered and disposed
of this conference report, I ask unanimous consent that the time for debate
be limited to 2 hours to the side, under
the proper procedures as to the control
of time, and that at the conclusion of
that time or when the time might be
yielded back, we proceed to a vote on the
adoption of the conference report.
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, and I shall object, I
would like now to permit the majority
and the minority leaders to speak. Or
does my objection stop further debate
on this?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Not at all.
Mr. GRAVEL. I reserve the right to
object, and I want to announce that I
shall object.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I
propose in lieu of the original proposal
that if anyone has any suggestion as to
what time they think would be more
proper, I would be glad to consider it
and perhaps agree to it. I ask unanimous
consent that we have 3 hours of debate
on each side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I think 1t is
rather late .in the day and late in the
first phase of this session to bring a conference report of this magnitude before
the Senate.
I would point out that my figures are
not up to date. Unfortunately, the Defense Department has not forwarded to
me the weekly casualty list for the past
several weeks. I am sure that it was an
oversight. However, as of July 10, less
than a month ago, 300,871 Americans
were wounded; 45,373 Americans died
in combat; 9,653 Americans died in noncombat capacities-55,026 Americans
dead in Vietnam, in Southeast Asia;
355,897 American casualties as of July 10,
1971.
Just lately I received some lnformation relative to the number of amputee
casualties because of the war in Southeast Asia.
In 1966, there were 88.
In 1967, there were 203.
In 1968, there were 439.
In 1969, there were 609.
In 1970, there were 312.
From January to April 1971, there
were 72.
There have been a total of 1,723
amputees.
In regard to the number of servicemen
in Southeast Asia who are addicted to
drugs, I am informed by the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment:
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second most costly war in the history of
this Republic. This war has cost us
around $120 to $130 billion conservatively speaking. Not only do the cities of
Southeast Asia burn, but the cities at
home also bum because of riots and poverty and ghettos.
So, we have the casualties, 355,000
Americans, and we have the cost which
will be doubled and redoubled into the
next century. And we have the growing
drug problem. Yet a Senate amendment,
which the Senate adopted by a vote of
61 to 37, calling for a total pullout of
U.S. troops within 9 m<>nths 1f at the
same time all POW's are released and all
missing in action wherever possible are
identified or found, was vitiated in a conference between the two Houses.
Of course the amendment 1s better
than nothing, but that is not saying much.
If we mean what we say, that our main
objective before we· will withdraw is to
bring ab<>ut the release of our prisonet s
of war, why do we not proceed on that
basis? Madame Binh, the chief Vietcong
negQtiator, Xuan Thuy, the chief North
Vietnamese negotiator, and the No.
5 man in the North Vietnamese Polit
Boro, Le Doc Tho, have made a proposition that they will consider a withdrawal
in line with the prisoner release on a
phase basis and apart and separate from
the other five points in the seven-point
proposal advanced in Paris a little over
a month ago.
Mr. President, some poople may denigrate the war in Vietnam and Southeast
Asia. Some poople may try to shrug off
these 350,000 American casualties. Sorr•e
people may think little of the cost in tm
area which is not, has not, and ner.er
will be vital to the security of this cl'.untry.

Oh, yes, I have read speeches prepared-not given, but prepared-·about
how the Southeast Asia Treaty was a justification for our going into Southeast
Asia.. And I have had my name mentioned in reference to that fact because
along with Secretary Dulles and our late
colleague, former Senator Alexander
Smith of New Jersey; I was one of the
three U.S. signatories to that treaty. But
that treaty applied to nations primarily
outside of Indochin~the Philippines.
Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, France, Indochina was brought in
as a corollary under the umbrella of
SEATO because at that time the Indochinese states of Laos, Camb<>dia, and
South Vietnam were outside the perimeter of the treaty.
But the one thing which this statement, which was inserted in the RECORD
but which was not read, left out was thn t
before this country would go to war t
that part of the world under the tr "' ,
We are now engaged In an enlarging testIng program to determine the extent of drug of that agreemen t would be .. due , '
addiction there. Based on ava.lla.ble data, stltutional proCf'f>fl ..... 'I 11c Senator f • •,.
the number of addicted servicemen appears Montan:1 v:;. -- lh ..: nnf" l>ho insisted t: ..
to be considerably fewer than 40,000. We tho .. ' '" rds t-r tllllucled in that trea ·
anticipate more a.ccurate estimates as the and · r'ue consti tutional processes" de ;·
detection program proceeds. The highest pri- not mean signin& a Southeast Asia. Treaty:
ority attention Is being given to control of nor does it mean approving a. Gulf o :
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I drug tralfic. detection of addiction, and treatwould like to be heard, too, at that time. ment and rehabilitation of servicemen who Tonkin resolution.
This conference report is an importHowever, I suggest that the request be become victims of drug addiction.
ant matter. For the first time, by an
made first.
It 1s high time. It is long past time.
overwhelming vote, the Senate expressed
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I will withThis 1s the longest war, I believe, in its strong desire that this war be,
hold my request.
the history of this Republic. It is the brought to a conclusion within 9 months,
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with the proviso that within that time
there would have to be a phased release
of U.S. prisoners of war to match our
phased withdrawal.
What have we got to lose? President
Nixon has had in effect for two and a
half years a policy of phased withdrawal
of American troops. He is doing that
already, and I give him full credit for
what he has done but it is not fast
enough.
Do we withdraw as slowly because we
want to give the Government of South
Vietnam "a reasonable chance to survive?" Well, to my personal knowledge,
since 1954, for 17 years we· have been
equipping, advising, supplying, and aiding during most of that time, paying for
the cost of equipment which the South
Vietnamese Army used. We have had our
generals there since 1954.
What do we mean when we say "a reasonable chance?" Is 17 years not long
enough? Is an army of 1.1 million men,
equipped, trained, supplied, and advised
by us not enough? Are not 355,000 American casualties enough? Is $130 billiononly a third of the ultimate payment for
this involvement-not enough?
What kind of people are we? Why are
we in Southeast Asia? What for, at
what cost, and for what reason? It is
about time that Congress woke up, as the
American people have awakened, I repeat, to the casualties, the costs, the corruption, the drug addiction, and all the
other evils and tragedies which have
beset this country since this mistaken
war got underway.
We have paid far too much and gotten
nothing but trouble, and dimculty and
danger to ourselves.
Yes, we can burn cities in South Vietnam, and in the delta, cities like Ben
Tre. We can "destroy" those cities to
"save" them. Our own cities are burning
in a different way, but burning just as
fiercely. Our own people are divided, not
because of race primarily, but because
of Vietnam and all it entails. Many of our
own people are going hungry and our
prestige has fallen in every continent of
the world.
I am not interested in face, personally,
although I have my share of pride. I am
not interested in prestige. I am interested in people, and the people I am
most interested in are my own people in
the United States of America. The country I am most interested in is my own
country, the United States of America.
We have a lot to talk about and every
Senator has a tremendous responsibility
in this situation, just as the President
has, but this is not a case of adversary
proceedings; it is a case of paying the
piper for the mistakes which we have
made for far more than a decade. It
is time for us in this body, in this Congress, and in this country to face up to
our responsibilities regardless of the coot,
and to act a.ocordingly. ·
I think it would be better, therefore,
instead of trying to get a time limitation for tonight or tomorrow, which in
my opinion would be impossible to
achieve, if we agree here and now to
make this conference report the pending
business on Monday, September 13, and
at that time debate it, thrash out our
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differences, and see what our decision we got into the situation we did with rewill be.
gard to the draft bill.
Mr. SCOT!'. Mr. President, I believe
We would like to see it disposed of. We
the Senator from Alaska reserved the stand ready to see that it is disposed of.
right to object.
The Armed Services Committee, for the
If I may yield 5 minutes on this side, most part, is ready to dispose of it.
I may say it would not be ditlicult to find
I well understand the impassioned
fault with the sorry record of a war feelings of the distinguished majority
which has been going on entirely too leader, I share them, but I do not see how
long with its many tragic consequences. the return of the prisoners of war is afI think perhaps the point of variance fected by failure to enact the draft bill.
here might be the difference on the asI understan d the language of the prosumption of our much beloved friend, the posed compromise would have the effect
distinguished majority leader, that be- of drawing from the administration some
cause the enemy have indicated they will indication tha t , following the release of
sever some of these points from the point the prisoners of war, it would only be a
of withdrawing and the return of the matter of a relatively short time before
POW's, there is at the same time no evi- the withdrawal of American forces could
dence that the enemy actually will do be effected. But the administration is
what he says. There is vast differenc0, doing 1ts level best to remove prisoners of
as we have found out in 17 years be- war, who were not taken prisoner under
tween whlllt the enemy will do and what this administration for the most part;
the enemy says he will do.
and it ought not to be impeded, it seems
The President was asked about this to me, by a requirement by the Congress
point at the press conference and his that our negotiations for the removal of
reply was that he understandsthe prisoners of war be turned over to
There has been some crltlclsm In the Sen- the Congress by virtue of the enactment
ate and the House that the adminlstratlon of a clause in the draft bill.
is not interested in negotiating a settlement,
So I would hope that we would go
that we are not considering the various proposals that have been made by the VC and through with the draft bill. I regret any
objections being made. I would very
North VIetnam.
much prefer that we act on it now, but if
He goes on to say, on the contrary in we do not, it seems to me it would be
denying that:
very useful if the majority leader and
We are very actively pursu1ng negotiations I could m anage to secure an agreement
on VIetnam in establlshed channela. The on time when we come back. Otherwise,
Record, when It finally comes out, will an- it may be that we will be debating this
swer all critics, as far as the activity of thla
government In pursuing negotiations in es- bill from September 13 for the rest of
tabllahed channels. It wou1d not be useful the year, which is something that I do
not look forward to.
to negotiate in the newspapers . . .
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
Certainly, we want to get at it. Certainly we want our prisoners of war the Senator yield?
Mr. SCOT!'. Yes; I am glad to yield.
back, and certainly even during the reMr. MANSFIJ!:LD. Mr. President, I apcess there may be developments. I know
of none, but there may be developments preciate the temperate tone of th~ diswith regard to these questions, including tinguished minority leader. I know that
prisoners of war. We hope so. Negotia- every MeQlber of this body, regardless of
tions are being pursued and negotiations how we vote. feels as we do about the terare being pursued hard and continuously nble cost of life in this tragedy in S"outh
and all the time. Therefore, what the V1etnam and Southeast Asia.
I agree with him that it is not the fault
distinguished majority leader and I both
want, and that is to accomplish release of the administration, but I would say it
for the prisoners and to find a way to get is the responsibility of the Senate and
out of the war as soon as possible, could the House--the Congress-that we have
be achieved, I think, without impeding a voice, under the Constitution; that we
the adoption of a major issue which this should recognize our responsibilities; and
Congress has supported under previous that we should act accordingly.
No one is denigrating the President,
Presidents and should not deny, in my
because, stl"ange as it might seem, the
opinion, to this administration.
It seems to me it also should not put desire on the part of Congress-and that
itself in the position where the effect of desire h as been evidenced since January
the draft law, that part of it remaining 20, 1969-is to help the President. For
on the books, operates to discriminate some reason or other, there are people in
against those who have received defer- the bureaucracy downtown who have the
ments and acted abundantly in good idea that because we belong to Congress,
faith and who now may be subject to a we are natural adversaries of whoever
callup because the lawful normal, regular happens to be President. They think that
operation of the law in accordance with if the Republicans are in power, we Demthe lottery principle has been delayed in ocrats are against them.
I think I can say without fear of conthis body, the Senate.
I think it is unfortunare that we have tradiction that this Democrat-controlled
to go into a recess period. Of course, if Senate, the Democrats in this body, have
we do, I would hope that we could come offered to this President every possible
to a time agreement when we come back cooperation in the field of foreign policy.
and take it up again on the 13th of As fa r as the Senator from Montana is
September. I think it is unfortu- concerned, that -cooperation is going to
nate, and I point out that it is in no way be offered again and again and ·again,
the fault of the administration, that the because the least important thing in our
draft bill is no longer the law, and it is lives as politicians is whether or not one
not the fault of the administration that party or the other wins, whether or not
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members of one party or the other are
elected or defeated. For a little while
we think it is important, but the thing
that counts is the welfare of the Nation
as a whole. This Republic is facing the
most dangerous period in its history, and
the times do not call for adversary proceedings. The times call for cooperation
and accommodation, as we have in this
body between the two leaders and between the two parties, and as we would
like to do in relation to the administration downtown. We want to work together because, while it may be hard
to believe because a politician says it, we
all are agreed, in my opinion, that the
welfare of the Nation comes ahead of the
success of either party or any individual
member.
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